The US and China Just Created a Board of Trade. Nobody Can Agree on What It Actually Means.

Most supply chain teams have spent the past year building contingency plans around the assumption that US-China trade relations would remain adversarial. Trump's state visit to Beijing this week shifted the framing, without fully resolving what comes next.

The two sides announced the creation of a US-China Board of Trade and a Board of Investment, giving both governments a formalised structure to discuss tariffs, import controls, export controls, and non-tariff barriers. China's Ministry of Commerce framed the board of trade as a forum to discuss concerns, as well as issues like tariff reductions, and said the two nations "agreed in principle" to mutually reduce tariffs on certain products. 

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer described the board as the first such mechanism ever established between the two countries, noting that the US intends to put out a call for public comment on which trade categories to prioritise, focused specifically on non-sensitive goods. The details beyond that remain sparse, and both sides have been careful to frame the current outcomes as preliminary. 

What was actually agreed, and what was not

The headline commitments from the summit are more concrete on the agricultural side than on the structural side. China agreed to purchase approximately $17 billion in US agricultural goods annually, on top of existing soybean commitments made in October 2025, which would bring total annual US agricultural exports to China to roughly $27 billion. Beijing also agreed to address US concerns on supply chain shortages of rare earths and critical minerals and restrictions on related processing equipment, though Beijing's public statements did not explicitly mention these issues. 

China also agreed to re-register previously deregistered US meat exporting facilities, clearing the way for those suppliers to resume exports, and committed to reviewing a range of US agricultural biotechnology traits. On the aviation side, China has agreed to order 200 Boeing aircraft, which Greer described as the first major Boeing purchase commitment from China in almost a decade. 

What was not agreed is at least as important. The Board of Trade framework, as described by people closely tracking the negotiations, would see the two governments lower tariffs on products they approve for trade and keep them elevated on products they want to restrict, creating what one source called a "tariff canyon." The arrangement leaves untouched the US and Europe's long list of structural complaints about the Chinese economic system, including subsidies, pressure on US firms to share technology, and below-market-price exports that displace competitors. 

Why this creates a new kind of planning problem

One veteran trade negotiator described the approach as "realistic," arguing it is futile to try to reset the relationship through rules-based market opening. A former US Chamber of Commerce official took the opposite view, saying "it looks like China has won the long game." 

For supply chain teams, the more immediate question is operational rather than ideological. Existing duties remain in place, and legal jeopardy from ongoing IEEPA challenges means the entire tariff infrastructure could still change. Companies that once relied on China-plus-one sourcing strategies now face a more complex calculation, with China-plus-N regional diversification the more resilient position. 

Although the tariff conflict appears to be easing, analysts have warned that a potentially more damaging supply chain fight, specifically over technology, critical minerals, and industrial capacity, is just getting underway. The Board of Trade framework does not address those disputes. 

The exposure for European and Asian companies

The managed trade model that the Board of Trade implies creates asymmetric exposure for non-US companies. A framework that prioritises US agricultural exports, Boeing aircraft, and energy while maintaining elevated tariffs on sensitive goods effectively redirects Chinese purchasing toward US suppliers. For European and Asian exporters competing in those categories, the new structure does not lower barriers. It formalises them.

Both sides have called the current outcomes preliminary, with more to be hammered out by negotiators in the weeks and months to come. For procurement teams trying to make sourcing decisions today, that timeline is not a comfort. It is another variable to price in.